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ABSTRACT 
 As increased border security measures are adopted along the United States’ 
southern land border, researchers believe that an increase in illicit maritime traffic can be 
expected. As the primary maritime security agency, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is 
suffering from a lack of interdiction assets and resources and admits it is already only 
capable of responding to one-third of all known maritime smuggling events. Based on 
current data regarding drug interdictions within the maritime domain and the expectation 
that smuggling events will increase, can the number of successful interdictions be 
increased through greater interoperability and cooperation between the U.S. Navy (USN) 
and USCG? This thesis discusses the mission of both the USN and USCG and analyzes 
the role that Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) plays in coordinating 
counter-narcotics efforts. The research for this thesis suggests that JIATF South is 
successfully coordinating responsibilities among all involved agencies to maintain 
complete awareness of maritime drug smuggling, but that it now lacks the necessary 
assets to improve on the number of successful interdictions each year. The USN is aiming 
to surpass the previous goal of a 355-ship fleet by developing unmanned surface vehicles, 
which could prove to be the asset JIATF South needs. 
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The U.S. Coast Guard is currently overwhelmed with regard to securing the 
maritime border. The security of the maritime border is primarily tasked to the Coast Guard 
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Leaders of both these organizations have 
said they currently lack sufficient assets, which suggests that any increase in threats or 
missions will require additional assets and resources. For example, in a 2015 hearing held 
by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Rear 
Admiral Peter J. Brown, U.S. Coast Guard, stated that 90 percent of interdictions 
completed by the Coast Guard in 2014 were cued by intelligence, but its surface and 
aviation fleet assets only allowed them to respond to one-third of all actionable 
intelligence.1 This testimony illustrates that the Coast Guard is already at a disadvantage 
to act on all credible threats within the maritime domain. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Due to the multiple missions tasked to the Coast Guard and the vast amount of 
maritime area it is responsible for securing, the Coast Guard lacks the assets required to 
secure the maritime borders properly. The Coast Guard’s performance with regard to 
undocumented migrant and illegal drug interdictions indicates its current lack of 
effectiveness. 
By reviewing the Coast Guard’s available annual performance reports (APRs) from 
the past three years (2017–2019), it is clear that the Coast Guard has made progress 
 
1 Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Testimony 
before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) 




interdicting undocumented migrants and illegal drugs.2 However, regardless of the 
progress made, the Coast Guard continues to fail to meet its own goals in both mission 
areas. The Coast Guard’s stated goal is to leverage its capabilities and those of partner 
nations to interdict 75 percent of all known undocumented migrants attempting to enter the 
United States by maritime routes.3 Within this goal, the Coast Guard aims to be the 
organization responsible for over 50 percent of all migrants interdicted; these goals have 
been constant since 2017.4 For drug interdictions, the Coast Guard only sets goals with 
regard to the amount of cocaine to be seized and has steadily increased its goal: greater 
than 100 tons in 2017, 200 tons in 2018, and 240 tons in 2019.5 The Coast Guard also sets 
a goal to remove an overall percentage of all cocaine from non-commercial vessels within 
the maritime transit zone. This goal has decreased from greater than 11.5 percent in 2017 
to greater than 10 percent for both 2018 and 2019, none of which have been met.6 The two 
most important goals in terms of organizational success are the percent of undocumented 
migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard and the percentage of cocaine removed. 
The Coast Guard’s 2019 annual performance report shows that the total number of 
migrants attempting to enter the United States via maritime routes has steadily increased 
from 4,760 in 2017 to 7,093 in 2019. In 2017 and 2019, the overall effectiveness of all 
involved agencies and partner nations in interdicting migrants did not drastically change, 
but 2018 was an exception.7 In 2018, based on the total number of migrants attempting to 
 
2 United States Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 
2017 (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 2018), https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/
budget/FY%202018%20USCG%20APR%20Signed%206-12-19.pdf; United States Coast Guard, United 
States Coast Guard Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington, DC: United States Coast 
Guard, 2018), https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/
FY%202018%20USCG%20APR%20Signed%206-12-19.pdf; United States Coast Guard, United States 
Coast Guard Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 
2020), https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/FY19-USCG-APR.pdf?ver=2020-05-20-113137-
970. 
3 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 32. 
4 United States Coast Guard, 32. 
5 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2017, 14; United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2018, 33; 
United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 33. 
6 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2017, 14; United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2018, 33; 
United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 33. 
7 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 32. 
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enter the United States versus the total number successfully interdicted, the Coast Guard 
and its partners were only able to interdict 72, approximately 10 percent less than 2017 and 
2019. The 2018 report attributed this decrease in migrant interdictions to “shifting flows 
within the maritime domain and shifting resources due to more intensified drug trafficking 
flows in the Eastern Pacific.” The 2018 APR also states that the flow of maritime migrants 
in southern California increased by 300 percent that year.8 A significant decrease occurred 
in the percent of interdictions performed by the Coast Guard, which was down to 
approximately 34 percent in 2018 and 2019 from 53 percent in 2017.9 The reports attribute 
the increase in total interdictions and decrease in Coast Guard interdictions to 
developments in international partnerships.10 While the failure of the Coast Guard to meet 
its interdiction goals does not spell defeat since overall interdictions increased, the 2018 
information demonstrates that the Coast Guard does not have the capacity to adapt quickly 
to changes in maritime smuggling routes. 
With regard to drug interdictions, the amount of cocaine seized has slightly 
decreased since 2017, while the percentage of cocaine removed has remained stagnant.11 
The 2018 APR indicates that the Coast Guard reached a 10-year high of tonnage of cocaine 
removed per each interdiction event, but this number only amounted to 7.3 percent of all 
cocaine removed.12 Similarly, in 2019, the Coast Guard recorded the second highest 
amount of cocaine removed per event, yet removed less cocaine than 2018 overall, and 
recorded a higher percentage of removal, which still remained under its 10 percent goal.13 
While the reports do not directly indicate the total number of interdiction events completed, 
the 2018 and 2019 reports both indicate a decrease in interdictions. Both reports attribute 
the decrease in interdictions to an expansion of the trafficking area utilized by criminal 
 
8 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2018, 32. 
9 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 32. 
10 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2018, 32; United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 32. 
11 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 33. 
12 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2018, 34. 
13 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 33–34. 
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organizations, which places a greater necessity on long-range air and maritime assets.14 
This data suggests that the Coast Guard is able to identify, detect, and interdict the vessels 
carrying the most cocaine, but it lacks the required assets and capabilities to complete the 
number of interdictions necessary to meet its goals. 
A solution to the Coast Guard’s need for additional assets could be found through 
greater coordination with, and support from, the U.S. Navy’s growing aviation and surface 
fleets. The Navy currently has the capability to assist the Coast Guard with its mission and 
as the fleet continues to grow to the goal of 355 ships, the capacity to conduct these 
missions will increase as well.15 In 2019, the Navy’s Report to Congress on the Annual 
Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2020 indicates that 
approximately half of the fleet will be made up of large surface combatants (LSCs), 
traditionally cruiser and destroyer size ships, and small surface combatants (SSCs), made 
up of frigates and littoral combat ships.16 These classes of ships have similar capabilities 
to the ships within the Coast Guard fleet and are well suited for maritime interdiction 
operations. Another possible solution is to deploy alternative platforms, such as unmanned 
and autonomous vessels in lieu of traditional warships to support maritime border security. 
As the root of the problem appears to be a lack of Coast Guard assets to handle maritime 
border security, autonomous vessels could act as a force multiplier. 
The research questions this thesis explores are: What is the most effective method 
of providing the Coast Guard with the assets required to secure the maritime borders? Is it 
through greater cooperation and coordination between the Coast Guard and Navy, the 
deployment of unmanned or autonomous vessels, or a combination of the two? 
 
14 United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2018, 33–34; United States Coast Guard, USCG APR 2019, 
33–34. 
15 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–91, § 1025, 131 Stat. 
1542 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ91/PLAW-115publ91.pdf. 
16 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for 
Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2019), https://www.navy.mil/strategic/PB20_Shipbuilding_Plan.pdf. 
5 
B. BACKGROUND 
Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) are those responsible for the delivery of illegal narcotics to the United States. The 
United States has been combatting the trafficking of narcotics since President Nixon 
declared the War on Drugs in 1971.17 In 1981, as Colombian cartels were gaining strength 
and the United States was making negligible progress regarding the “War on Drugs,” 
Congress amended the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act to allow the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to provide support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.18 
Following this change, the Coast Guard established its tactical law enforcement teams 
(TACLET) and law enforcement detachments (LEDETs).19 Section 279 was added to Title 
10 U.S. Code to enable the U.S. Navy to support the Coast Guard in law enforcement 
missions.20 Section 279 states, “The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall provide that there be assigned on board every appropriate surface naval 
vessel at sea in a drug-interdiction area members of the Coast Guard who are trained in law 
enforcement and have powers of the Coast Guard under title 14, including the power to 
make arrests and to carry out searches and seizures.”21 Following this new collaborative 
effort between the services, the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act directed the 
DOD “to serve as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime 
transit of illegal drugs into the United States,” and the Coast Guard was designated as the 
lead agency for interdiction and arrest of drug traffickers.22  
 
17 “A Brief History of the Drug War,” Drug Policy Alliance, accessed February 28, 2021, 
https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war. 
18 Legislative Attorney, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to 
Execute Civilian Law, CRS Report No. R42659 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 
42, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20181106_R42659_a9b336fa9e37e2302a210433da31f27bd3287cdd.pdf. 
19 “History,” Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Association, accessed May 25, 2020, 
http://www.cgtle.org/history. 
20 Assignment of Coast Guard Personnel to Naval Vessels for Law Enforcement Purposes, Pub. L. No. 
99–570, § 279, 10 USC Chapter 15 (1986). 
21 Assignment of Coast Guard Personnel to Naval Vessels for Law Enforcement Purposes. 
22 Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, 
Least Understood Interagency Success (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 10, 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/documents/stratperspective/inss/strategic-perspectives-5.pdf. 
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After being designated as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of drug 
trafficking, the DOD created Task Force–4, which later became the Joint Interagency Task 
Force (JIATF) South.23 JIATF South has been heralded as a model for joint agency success 
and cooperation.24 Currently, JIATF South is made up of 16 different U.S. agencies to 
include the DOD, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and CBP, as well as 20 different 
partner nations.25 When celebrating its 20-year anniversary in 2009, JIATF South was 
responsible for interdicting 40 percent of cocaine globally and had seized a total of $190 
billion dollars in narcotics.26 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review first examines past and present maritime security strategies 
and focuses on how U.S. national security strategy documents have described the 
relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard, as well as suggestions scholars had 
previously made regarding this relationship. It then offers an analysis of one of the nation’s 
most significant maritime border security efforts, the JIATF South, followed by discussing 
the effects border security has had on TCOs and DTOs. It concludes with discussion about 
the current status and potential use of autonomous vehicles as a force multiplier. 
1. National Maritime Security Strategies 
From the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to the September 11 attacks, the 
United States faced very few direct threats to its national security. In this time period, the 
majority of military operations carried out were initiated due to human rights violations or 
safety of U.S. personnel overseas.27 Due to this general sense of security, the Navy and 
 
23 Munsing and Lamb, 12–22. 
24 Munsing and Lamb, 1. 
25 Geraldine Cook, “JIATF South: The Strength of Relationships,” Diálogo: Digital Military 
Magazine, September 9, 2019, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/jiatf-south-the-strength-of-
relationships/. 
26 Munsing and Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force-South, 3. 
27 Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2001, CRS 




U.S. government as a whole was slow to implement new strategies to counter the 
emergence of new threats that developed into 9/11. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush’s administration began 
developing what would become the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through 
various forms of legislation. While DHS was still in its infancy, homeland security 
presidential directives (HSPD) began to be issued to establish policy-making guidelines, 
including guidelines concerning maritime strategy and security.28 
In 2004, President Bush signed the “Maritime Security Policy,” HSPD-13, which 
was the first of these directives with specific focus on maritime security.29 This document 
directed “the coordination of U.S. Government maritime security programs and initiatives 
to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, 
State, local, and private sector entities.”30 It established the Maritime Security Policy 
Coordinating Committee (MSPCC), and called on the Secretaries of Defense and 
Homeland Security to create a joint national strategy for maritime security.31 The objective 
of this HSPD was to bring all agencies that have a role in maritime security together to 
increase awareness and capabilities collectively within the maritime domain. The president 
also called for the United States to be capable of fully deploying all operational assets to 
prevent the terrorists and criminals alike from using the maritime domain to harm 
American citizens, assets, or interests.32  
The National Strategy for Maritime Security was created in 2005 and contained 
eight supporting plans, such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness 
and the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, which are both geared specifically 
 
28 Harold C. Relyea, Presidential Directives: Background and Overview, Order Code 98-611 GOV 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-611.pdf. 
29 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive HSPD-13 (Washington, DC: White House, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/
nspd41.pdf. 
30 Bush, 1. 
31 Bush, 1.  
32 Bush, 2. 
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toward maritime defense of the homeland.33 While this document acknowledges the 
difficulties of preventing illegal seaborne immigration it also states, “as security in our 
ports of entry, at land-border crossings, and at airports continues to tighten, criminals and 
terrorists will likely consider our relatively undefended coastlines to be less risky 
alternatives for unlawful entry into the United States.”34 Throughout the remainder of the 
strategy, very little attention is given to the immigration problem or drug trafficking; 
instead, the focus is on stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Illegal immigration and drug trafficking each have their own paragraph within the strategy 
dedicated to the vulnerabilities that these issues cause while WMD is mentioned 19 times 
throughout the document. The strategy states “WMD issues are of the greatest concern 
since the maritime domain is the likely venue by which a WMD will be brought into the 
United States.”35 Although the strategy mentions and recognizes that a vessel is the most 
likely means of delivering a WMD to the United States, little discussion has resulted as to 
how interdiction efforts will be increased.  
While the overarching national strategy does not specifically discuss the efforts to 
increase interdictions, the combination of the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness and the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan illustrate how 
DHS can become more successful in carrying out interdictions. The plan for maritime 
domain awareness is focused on establishing a robust information-sharing environment 
between all stakeholders to support operational decision making.36 The MOTR Plan is a 
classified document, which provides protocols for a response to maritime threats by all 
branches of government.37 According to LCDR Craig Allen Jr, the plan does not delineate 
 
33 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 2005), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456414. 
34 Department of Defense, 6. 
35 Department of Defense, 4. 
36 Department of Defense, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MDAPlan_0.pdf. 
37 Craig Allen Jr., “Border Control behind the Scenes: Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan,” 
Center for International Maritime Security, August 19, 2014, https://cimsec.org/border-control-behind-
scenes-maritime-operational-threat-response-plan/. 
9 
a clear command and control relationship relying on all involved agencies to come together 
and cooperate to achieve a common goal.38 
In 2007, following the strategies and plans developed by DHS, the joint maritime 
strategy between the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard was revised for the first time 
since 1986. The new strategy was titled, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower.”39 This strategy was primarily drafted to introduce the new challenges being 
encountered as technology continued to advance and the world became more 
interconnected.40 A revision was completed in 2015, and while the title was not changed, 
the revised strategy breaks down the functions and operations of the nation’s sea going 
services by region of the world, as well as their role in supporting national security.  
Within the western hemisphere section of the new strategy, no discussion has been 
conducted of the Coast Guard and Navy working together to combat TCOs. The strategy 
does mention a new aircraft the Coast Guard is introducing to its fleet and states that the 
Navy will maintain Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, “to promote joint and combined 
military operations and to enhance interagency efforts to develop regional security and 
cooperation.”41 The report does go into detail with regard to the ship platforms that will 
be utilized to aid in a humanitarian crisis and later states, “other ships and aircraft will 
provide periodic presence for recurring military-to-military engagements, theater security 
cooperation exercises, and other missions.”42 While “other missions” include missions to 
combat drug trafficking and illegal immigration, it is not the explicit language someone 
 
38 Allen. 
39 Su Hao, “The U.S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking: Reviewing the ‘Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower,’” Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (2008): 68–72. 
40 United States Marine Corps, United States Department of the Navy, and United States Coast Guard, 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, United 
States Department of the Navy, United States Coast Guard, 2007), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479900. 
41 United States Marine Corps, United States Department of the Navy, and United States Coast Guard, 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. [Revision] (Washington, DC: United States Marine 
Corps, United States Department of the Navy, United States Coast Guard, 2015), https://www.navy.mil/
local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf. 
42 United States Marine Corps, United States Department of the Navy, and United States Coast Guard, 
18. 
10 
would expect to read based on the various other maritime strategies calling for deploying 
all operational assets. 
2. Analysis of the Coast Guard and Navy Relationship 
Prior to 9/11, the Coast Guard and Navy recognized the necessity of cooperation 
between their respective services and acknowledged that their strengths and roles were 
vastly different. In an effort to complement each other, they produced a joint statement 
titled National Fleet where they identified each service’s contribution to the national 
security and defense of the United States.43 Colin Gray criticized this document and called 
it a “treaty” between the services not to interfere with the missions either service carries 
out. He also argued that the Navy Strategic Planning Guidance with Long Range Planning 
Objectives, of 2000 did not complement the joint policy previously released.44 
Gray’s argument for how the services should operate contradicts the Coast Guard 
and Navy’s joint policy. He claimed the Navy needed to focus on warfighting and leave 
“coast guarding to the Coast Guard.”45 Gray explained that each service has the necessary 
skills and assets for very different missions and believes that to reduce the high operational 
tempo of the Navy’s peacetime fleet, the Coast Guard should pick up the naval operations 
that do not correlate to naval warfare. Gray argued that new frigate sized general purpose 
warships are required to recapitalize the national fleet. He stated that if the Navy cannot 
afford to operate these frigate-sized vessels, then they should be the Coast Guard’s sole 
responsibility to integrate properly with the Navy when conducting homeland defense 
missions.46 
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Charles Hamilton and Patrick Stillman identify processes undertaken by the Coast 
Guard and Navy to increase the Coast Guard’s readiness to support the Navy.47 For 
example, following 9/11, the Coast Guard decided to postpone the decommissioning of 13 
coastal patrol ships and utilize them for port and coastal area security missions. Hamilton 
and Stillman also identify a memorandum of agreement between the services in 2002 to 
support the procurement of the national security cutter and offshore patrol cutter for the 
Coast Guard and the littoral combat ship for the Navy. The memorandum was viewed as a 
method to recapitalize the fleet by promoting interoperability and increasing capabilities 
for the 21st century. Hamilton and Stillman argue that a national fleet consisting of new 
cutters, littoral combat ships, and other deepwater assets capable of seamless integration is 
a force multiplier in all maritime missions that cannot be ignored.48 
The discussion of providing assets to the Navy and Coast Guard for maritime 
security and counterterrorism operations is not new. Douglas Daniels, for example, 
published an article discussing the exact topic in the University of Miami Law Review.49 
Daniels discusses the difficulty of ensuring the appropriate service responds to the threats 
within its purview. He acknowledges that maritime threats to the homeland exist 
throughout the maritime domain and can be identified before entering the traditional 
operating area of the Coast Guard. He argues that for suspected maritime terrorists, 
regardless of location, the Coast Guard should complete the interdiction since the extent of 
the threat is unknown and the Coast Guard can act as a law enforcement agency, or if the 
situation permits, as an armed service. He continues to state that if a threat is so grave the 
mission should be deemed homeland defense, then permit the DOD to neutralize the threat 
via the most efficient means. He also suggests that the flexibility of the Coast Guard to act 
as a law enforcement agency or armed service allows for apprehended individuals to be 
treated as enemy prisoners of war.50 
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While Daniels clearly states that the Coast Guard is the service best suited for 
interdicting suspected maritime terrorists, he attempts to create a method of designating 
whether a particular interdiction should fall under Coast Guard or Navy responsibility.51 
He believes that it is not possible to create a boundary to identify clearly the area of 
responsibility of each service. Instead, he offers that the decision should be based upon 
who the target of the suspected attack is. Through this observation, it remains possible for 
the DOD to continue its missions of interdicting maritime terrorists abroad and to combat 
proliferation of weapons allowing for a robust layered defense toward maritime terrorism. 
However, he does agree that under specific circumstances, whichever asset is closest to the 
threat should respond. Finally, Daniels states that if the Coast Guard is expected to be the 
first responder to maritime terrorist threats, the DOD, DHS, Coast Guard, and Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) need to work together to establish proper plans and exercise 
those to ensure all agencies involved are able to respond effectively.52 
While these authors agree that each service has its own unique roles in maritime 
security, no agreement has been made among scholars and experts regarding how to move 
forward. Retired Coast Guard officers calling for the Coast Guard to be moved permanently 
to the DOD have written multiple articles in the United States Naval Institute’s magazine, 
Proceedings. Most of these arguments result from the support structure that the Coast 
Guard is exposed to while operating under DHS.53 The belief is that if the Coast Guard 
was to operate under the DOD full time, the Coast Guard could more effectively carry out 
the acquisition of new ships and technology, utilize the DOD supply logistics, and take 
advantage of the research and development infrastructure within the DOD.54 
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3. Joint Interagency Task Force South 
While JIATF South is highly successful in interdicting narcotics, it does not report 
much success in stopping seaborne illegal immigration. Even though its counter narcotics 
numbers are impressive, the Independent Auditor’s Report on the FY 2019 DOD 
Performance Summary Report for the Funds Obligated for National Drug Control 
Program Activities shows that its ability to respond to drug movement events that meet the 
interagency criteria has decreased since 2016.55 The 2019 report shows that JIATF South 
was only able to respond to 20 percent of these events. However, its success percentage is 
based on the events detected that lead to seizure or disruption, which was a 72 percent 
success rate while the target for the year was 80 percent. The report claims JIATF South 
was unable to meet its goal due to reduced availability of law enforcement air and maritime 
assets. The report also suggested that drug traffickers are finding success operating outside 
of the range of JIATF South air and maritime assets.56 
The National Drug Control Strategy highlights the reasons why JIATF South is a 
necessary organization. The strategy states that since nearly all illicit drugs are 
manufactured and produced in other nations, DTOs and TCOs represent a threat to the 
health, safety, and security to American communities and citizens while also causing a 
destabilizing effect within our partner nation’s borders.57 The ability of JIATF South to 
bring U.S. law enforcement agencies together while working with partner nations through 
which the illicit trafficking begins or travels strengthens all the nations involved and brings 
legitimacy to those nations with reduced capabilities. JIATF South gives credit to 
whichever agency makes the actual seizures or arrests. Since CBP knows that its assets will 
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be used effectively and will receive credit for the operations, it dedicates 80 percent of its 
operational air assets to JIATF South.58  
The partnerships with other nations are necessary components for success since 
Navy and Coast Guard vessels cannot easily enter all nations’ territorial waters to pursue 
suspected traffickers or to carry out law enforcement activities.59 Through these 
partnerships, JIATF South forces are able to continue to monitor suspect vessels and have 
that information relayed to partner nation law enforcement to intervene successfully. This 
same operational concept also relates to partnering navies, such as the French Navy, which 
is authorized to perform law enforcement functions from which the U.S. military is 
barred.60 
4. Transnational Criminal Organizations/Drug Trafficking 
Organizations and Border Security 
As law enforcement agencies became more effective, transnational criminal and 
drug trafficking organizations shift tactics to maintain a relative level of success. For 
example, in the early 1990s, the majority of drugs arriving in the United States came using 
non-commercial aircraft, but as capabilities to detect these aircraft and pinpoint their 
location of debarkation increased, law enforcement authorities were able to force these 
organizations mostly to abandon aircraft as a viable means of transportation.61 
This same concept has become evident in drug smuggling across the United States’ 
southern land border as well. As CBP has increased its success in interdicting the 
movement of drugs and people between ports of entry, these DTOs have resorted to 
creating underground tunnels beginning in Mexico and terminating in both California and 
Arizona.62 They also attempt to hide their drugs among legitimate cargo within vehicles 
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that attempt to enter the United States legally through ports of entry.63 The general opinion 
of law enforcement and government officials is that as advancements are made in 
interdicting these drug shipments, the agencies involved are not stopping the flow but 
displacing it. This concept is known as the “balloon effect,” which is seen when squeezing 
a balloon; the air is restricted in some areas but finds other areas to burst out.64 
The balloon effect can also be seen with the trafficking of drugs and people. As 
CBP became better at interdicting individuals at the legal ports of entry, the focus of illegal 
border crossing shifted to the land area between the ports of entry.65 Moreover, when drug 
trafficking by air became more difficult, traffickers moved to sea routes instead.66 So far, 
the bulk of maritime human trafficking occurs through the United States’ southeast coast, 
since the majority of these immigrants are from the Caribbean and the Coast Guard is 
seeing a trend that suggests that maritime migration is increasing.67 In 2018, for example, 
the number of migrants interdicted in the waters off the southwest coast increased by five 
times the amount interdicted in 2016 and 2017 combined.68 
5. Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
Peter Winstead conducted a cost benefit analysis of developing and integrating 
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the U.S. Navy fleet to perform missile defense and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. This analysis shows that the 
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implementation of USVs was both cost effective and provided increased capability.69 His 
research demonstrates that the ISR USV platform provided approximately a six percent 
increase in success of destroying enemy vessels in the examined maritime battle 
simulation. Following the results of the simulation, the cost effectiveness of a $500 million 
investment goes much further in the procurement of 10 USVs compared to a single littoral 
combat ship, which alone exceeds the investment amount. His findings show that 
employing 10 USVs compared to a single LCS is a force multiplier requiring the enemy to 
detect and track 10 relatively small radar cross sections compared to one of the LCS, which 
reduces the potential number lives lost in combat.70 
While unmanned vehicles are certainly capable of improving the capabilities of 
conventional military forces, Evan Karlik hypothesizes that “proliferating autonomous 
systems in contested waters could spark accidental clashes.”71 Karlik references when Iran 
shot down a U.S. military unmanned aerial vehicle in 2019 and when the Chinese Navy 
captured a U.S. unmanned undersea vehicle in 2016.72 He believes that weak responses by 
the U.S. government could embolden these nations to continue to interfere, capture, or 
destroy unmanned vessels as they become more prevalent in the battle space.73 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research focused on the current effectiveness of the organizations tasked with 
maintaining U.S. maritime border security. This thesis primarily relied upon reports 
generated by the Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office, and 
the Coast Guard and Navy themselves. Congressional hearings were also reviewed to 
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understand congressional concerns, as well as the challenges identified by leaders of these 
organizations. The issues and shortfalls discovered lead to a review of available 
information regarding USVs under development by the U.S. Navy to assess their viability.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into four chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter II 
discusses the maritime border security missions of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and 
JIATF South and identifies the shortfalls and disadvantages. The third chapter discusses 
current research and development efforts of unmanned surface vehicles. The final chapter 
reviews the findings from Chapters II and III and provides recommendations to improve 
U.S. maritime border security. 
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II. UNITED STATES MARITIME BORDER SECURITY 
Maritime security is currently a shared responsibility between the DOD and DHS. 
The DOD utilizes the Navy and Marine Corps as its primary forces for securing the 
international maritime domain. DHS primarily tasks this mission to the Coast Guard, CBP, 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).74 While the DOD focuses on 
international maritime operations to ensure the free flow of commerce and maintaining 
America’s strategic influence, DHS focuses on protecting the United States’ homeland and 
its citizens from attack and enforcement of applicable U.S. regulations and laws.75 
The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security identifies five threat areas: 
nation-state threats, terrorist threats, transnational criminal and piracy threats, 
environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.76 This chapter focuses on the 
role of the Navy, Coast Guard, and JIATF South in combating these threats. This chapter 
then identifies how the DOD and DHS currently integrate to accomplish maritime security 
and the associated shortfalls. 
A. UNITED STATES NAVY MARITIME SECURITY MISSION 
The United States’ Navy’s approach to maritime security focuses on the projection 
of power to maintain the maritime domain’s capability to further U.S. interests and deny 
the same to its adversaries. The Navy accomplishes this mission mainly through its aircraft 
carriers and surface ships maintaining a presence in strategic waters, nuclear-powered 
submarines completing the Navy’s responsibility within the nuclear triad, and sailors 
building and developing partnerships with allied nations through port visits and 
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humanitarian aid missions.77 These approaches primarily focus on nation-state threats and 
terrorist threats. While the Navy also focuses on the remaining threats, they are typically 
pursued as secondary missions or through work with its international partnerships and 
alliances. 
The U.S. Navy and the DOD have historically been used as diplomacy tools. Naval 
diplomacy involves the use of a nation’s naval forces to further its political objectives by 
influencing foreign policymakers.78 The Navy focuses on projecting power to maintain 
U.S. international influence through cooperative diplomacy vice coercive diplomacy. 
Cooperative naval diplomacy is “the established method of influencing decisions and 
behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue and other measures short 
of war or violence.”79 The primary concept of cooperative naval diplomacy is that a 
country’s naval forces are deployed in a way to be viewed as non-threatening, so that both 
friendly and potentially hostile nations accept the force’s movements and presence. This 
form of diplomacy is often achieved through joint multinational exercises and maintaining 
a forward naval presence in specific geographic areas. 
The U.S. military is arguably the largest proponent of maintaining a forward 
presence to pursue the United States’ political objectives. The U.S. Navy, for example, 
maintains forward-deployed naval bases in Japan, Spain, and Bahrain, each specifically 
located to promote the projection of power toward a peer or near-peer competitor. These 
forward-deployed forces serve two purposes, first, as a deterring force against the nation’s 
adversaries, and second, as a force for strengthening alliances and promoting security 
cooperation.80 Maintaining these combat-ready forces in the United States’ strongest 
allies’ vicinity marks a clear commitment to the allies’ well-being and success. These 
forces have historically played critical roles in assisting partner nations responding to and 
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recovering from natural disasters, such as assisting Japan in 2011 following the earthquake 
and tsunami, which led to thousands of deaths, and nuclear disaster at the Fukushima power 
plant.81 During this time, the U.S. Navy provided humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief efforts by using 15 warships and eight Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels over 
30 days. Over half of the ships involved in relief efforts arrived on station and began 
operations with 48 hours.82 
While humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are intended to support 
allied nations and promote partnerships, they also manage to demonstrate the naval force’s 
mobility and readiness.83 These operations allow the U.S. Navy to operate with its allies 
outside of a highly planned and coordinated joint exercise. These situations demonstrate 
the capabilities and cooperation within the civil-military relationship at the international 
level and create a favorable view of the United States.84 
Coercive diplomacy, often called gunboat diplomacy in the naval sense, is another 
method of naval diplomacy. Coercive naval diplomacy is “the use or threat of limited naval 
force aimed at securing one’s advantage or averting loss.”85 Coercive diplomacy relies on 
the naval force and its adversary to be co-located at the decisive point to ensure the greatest 
impact. Three common coercive diplomacy methods exist: show of force, operational 
deployment, and naval demonstration. Show of force is the demonstration of naval combat 
capabilities and the willingness to use force. In today’s world, it is often achieved through 
testing or a demonstration of new weapon capabilities.86 
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Operational deployments can be ordered as a preventative measure or in reaction 
to a crisis.87 In the example of U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1974, a carrier 
strike group’s deployment served to be both preventative and reactive. When the war broke 
out, the Navy only had a few available assets located in the Arabian Gulf. A carrier strike 
group was formed and designated as Task Force 74. Task Force 74 entered the Indian 
Ocean on 10 December 1971 to force the Indian navy to monitor its movements; 
consequently, seven days later, the task force departed the Bay of Bengal following a cease-
fire between India and Pakistan.88 
Naval demonstrations serve two purposes, first, to illustrate that a nation has an 
interest in the outcome of a specific conflict, and second, to represent the willingness of a 
nation to commit additional forces or to become involved in the conflict.89 The United 
States’ reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis serves as a unique example of a naval 
demonstration. After the United States observed the establishment of Soviet medium and 
intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy faced the difficult task of 
convincing the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to remove these offensive weapons. U.S. 
policymakers ultimately decided to use the Navy to establish a “quarantine” of Cuba. The 
quarantine went into effect on 23 October 1962, and U.S. naval vessels were ordered to 
search any ships suspected of carrying offensive weapons to Cuba. The crisis ended five 
days later when the Soviet Union vowed to dismantle all offensive weapons in Cuba as 
long as the United States removed its missiles from Turkey and Europe and promised never 
to invade Cuba.90  
Cooperative and coercive diplomacy is intended to counter the nation-state threat 
identified in the National Strategy for Maritime Security. However, through these actions, 
the United States will further its political objectives and ideally increase its favorability 
with its allies and potential adversaries.91 Through naval diplomacy, a cooperative 
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maritime security strategy can be adopted, which will combat the terrorist threat to the 
United States and its interests.  
While the U.S. Navy does not explicitly focus on maritime border security, assets 
and resources are allocated to the mission to support JIATF South efforts. The DOD is the 
lead agency for detecting and monitoring maritime trafficking of illegal narcotics to the 
United States. The DOD commits ships from the Navy, as well as aircraft from both the 
Navy and Air Force.92 To comply with the Posse Comitatus Act, the military supports 
interdictions while conducting maritime operations in international waters. Coast Guard 
personnel assigned to a LEDET that embarks on the vessel accomplishes the actual 
interdictions and boardings.93 Thus, the U.S. Navy can assist law enforcement agencies 
and avoid acting as a law enforcement agency itself. 
B. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD MARITIME AND BORDER 
SECURITY MISSION 
The Coast Guard has a significantly different mission than the Navy; and although 
it is a U.S. military service, it operates under DHS rather than under the DOD. Of the five 
threats identified in the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the Coast Guard actively 
combats four of them: terrorist threats, transnational criminal and piracy threats, 
environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.94 The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 identifies the Coast Guard’s 11 mission areas and organizes them into 
homeland security missions and non-homeland security missions.95 The five identified 
homeland security missions are the security of ports, waterways, and coastal areas; drug 
interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other law enforcement roles. The 
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Coast Guard also combats environmental degradation through its non-homeland security 
missions of safeguarding living marine resources and marine environmental protection.96 
These Homeland Security Act missions directly correlate to the identified threat areas of 
the National Maritime Security Strategy. 
The Coast Guard has a unique function; during peacetime, it serves as a law 
enforcement and maritime security agency within DHS, but during wartime, it can be 
moved to the DOD, if Congress or the president sees fit.97 While the Coast Guard 
maintains units deployed internationally, similar to the Navy for building partnerships, the 
Coast Guard’s primary role is conducting operations near the United States. This section 
focuses on the Coast Guard’s missions that support maritime security in the United States’ 
vicinity, specifically regarding operations within the Western Hemisphere transit zone 
(WHTZ). 
Americans best know the Coast Guard as the service that interdicts drug traffickers 
and seaborne illegal immigrants. Through interdiction of these suspicious vessels, the 
Coast Guard is also combating terrorism by ensuring that illicit cargo, such as weapons of 
mass destruction, and terrorists themselves do not reach the United States’ shores 
undetected. These missions are completed using the various assets the Coast Guard has and 
the intelligence generated by the Coast Guard and received from other agencies. 
This area, known as the WHTZ, is a seven million square-mile area encompassing 
the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The Coast Guard is 
the lead agency for apprehending drug traffickers within the maritime domain.98 Like the 
Navy, the Coast Guard uses partnerships with other nations within the area as a force 
multiplier to increase mission effectiveness. The United States currently has bilateral 
agreements with 43 foreign nations to improve maritime counterdrug missions. 
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Specifically, within the transit zone, 14 nations, including Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom, have partnerships to increase mission accomplishment.99 
International partnerships with other transit zone stakeholders are crucial to 
combating the narcotics flow to the United States. For example, in 2018, 66 percent of all 
Coast Guard interdictions involved a bilateral or operational procedures agreement.100 
Typically, when vessels carrying narcotics depart their port of origin, they are not headed 
directly for the United States, but instead toward areas within Central America where the 
bulk shipments are broken down into smaller packages to be transported to the United 
States.101 Partnerships with the nations where the bulk shipments begin and terminate, 
allows the Coast Guard to pursue detected vessels into that nation’s territorial waters. 
Additionally, the partnerships expedite intelligence flow regarding potential suspect 
vessels and improve interoperability between all stakeholders. Intercepting the bulk 
shipments before they can be broken down is the most efficient means of removing 
narcotics from circulation. 
The Coast Guard carries out its mission to intercept seaborne immigrants in the 
same manner that it conducts its counter-narcotics missions. Using maritime patrol aircraft 
and surface vessels, the Coast Guard can detect and intercept vessels suspected of human 
trafficking. These missions are often carried out to prevent migrants from reaching the 
United States’ shores and due to the safety of life at sea since many illegal immigration 
attempts are made in vessels that are not seaworthy.102 
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The Coast Guard carried out two major peacetime humanitarian assistance 
operations in the early 1990s following events in Haiti and Cuba.103 The first was 
Operation Able Manner. Following a military coup in Haiti, Haitians began to flee Haiti. 
At the peak of Operation Able Manner, the Coast Guard committed 17 cutters, nine aircraft, 
and the Navy had committed five of its ships.104 Over the busiest four days, the Coast 
Guard and Navy rescued 9,697 Haitians; throughout 1994, over 20,000 Haitians were 
rescued.105 The Coast Guard later carried out a similar mission named Operation Able 
Vigil, which aimed to aid fleeing Cubans in the Straits of Florida.106 This operation 
involved 29 Coast Guard Cutters, six aircraft, and nine U.S. Navy ships. Throughout 
Operation Able Vigil, over 30,000 Cubans were interdicted.107 
The Coast Guard’s migrant interdiction mission is centered on nations located in 
the Caribbean Sea, primarily Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.108 In 2019, over 
7,000 migrants attempted to enter the United States via maritime routes.109 Of those 7,000, 
6,107 were successfully interdicted, with the Coast Guard being responsible for 2,441 
migrants interdicted. The year 2019 saw a 73 percent increase in detected migrants 
attempting to enter the United States via maritime routes. While most detected migrants 
were interdicted, the Coast Guard could not achieve its goal of interdicting 50 percent of 
detected migrants. The Coast Guard attributes this failure to the lack of assets and increased 
agreements with the countries being fled.110 
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The number of migrants attempting to enter the United States each year through 
maritime means has seen large fluctuations over the past six years. The number peaked at 
10,629 in 2014, while its lowest was 4,670 in 2017.111 The flow of migrants depends 
heavily on foreign relations with the countries from which the individuals are attempting 
to emigrate. For example, the low number reported in 2017 is due to normalized relations 
between the United States and Cuba, which led to a 71 percent reduction in Cuban migrant 
flow.112 It is difficult to say if the Coast Guard’s maritime immigration interdictions serve 
as a deterrent for human traffickers due to the difficulty in prosecuting them successfully. 
As mentioned in a 2009 congressional hearing on the Coast Guard’s drug and migrant 
interdiction efforts, Representative Howard Coble stated that to convict a human trafficker 
on felony charges, prosecutors must be able to prove that the smuggler has made a profit, 
forced migrants to attempt the voyage, or confirm a migrant was seriously injured during 
the journey.113 Without a significant deterrent beyond being returned to their native 
countries, human trafficking will likely continue to occur. 
C. JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH MISSION 
While the Coast Guard is the lead agency for interdiction and apprehension of drug 
traffickers within the transit zone, JIATF South is the agency tasked with coordinating all 
detection and monitoring activities.114 All agencies with a role in maritime security come 
together under JIATF South to achieve it. JIATF South is a subordinate of U.S. Southern 
Command and led by a Rear Admiral of the U.S. Coast Guard. The agency comprises 
representatives from the DOD, CBP, Department of Justice, Department of State, ICE, 
DHS, and DEA. The Department of State negotiated a bilateral agreement with 43 foreign 
nations to aid in the coordination of detection, monitoring, and apprehension missions. 
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Through this agreement, Central and South American countries station liaison officers at 
JIATF South for interoperability and cooperation.115  
JIATF South describes the interdiction process as beginning with the collection of 
actionable intelligence.116 This intelligence is then used to reduce the patrol area of the 
operation unit and decrease response time. Next, an available maritime patrol aircraft from 
the DOD, Coast Guard, CBP, or allied nation is tasked with detecting and monitoring 
suspect vessels. Once the suspect vessel is detected, the vessel is handed off to a surface 
asset to complete interdiction and apprehension. Finally, the U.S. Justice Department is 
responsible for coordinating the disposition of the crew, contraband, and vessel with the 
flag state of the vessel for prosecution.117 JIATF South currently leads 14 countries in a 
counter-drug operation titled Operation Martillo (Hammer), which began in 2012 and has 
resulted in the seizure of 693 metric tons of cocaine, $25 million in bulk cash, detainment 
of 581 vessels and aircraft, and the arrest of 1,863 detainees.118 
D. DOD AND DHS INTEGRATION 
As stated in the previous section, the JIATF South is responsible for combining the 
available assets from the DOD and DHS together to increase maritime security in the 
WHTZ.119 JIATF South is extremely capable of carrying out the level of coordination 
required to bring these agencies together, which has led to JIATF South being considered 
the “gold standard” in interagency organizations.120 When the current JIATF South was 
established in 1999, although called JIATF East, by merging with JIATF East and South, 
the task force was able to create a better intelligence picture since JIATF South’s previous 
mission was to conduct counterdrug operations in the countries where the drugs originated 
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and provide its intelligence to JIATF East for interdiction.121 Once the two organizations 
became one, relaying the information was not delayed, and the JIATF was capable of pre-
positioning interdiction assets. Due to higher priority tasking of assets within the DOD, 
JIATF South experienced a 68 percent and 62 percent decline in flight hours and ship days, 
respectively, between 1992 and 1999.122 Thanks to the lack of assets, JIATF South 
recognized that it could no longer rely on defense in depth to detect smugglers and would 
instead need to rely on generating and disseminating quality intelligence. JIATF South 
reportedly changed its tactics from using many interdiction assets and 15 to 20 percent 
intelligence to relying on intelligence for over 80 percent of interdiction operations and 
using less interdiction assets.123 
JIATF South generates more actionable intelligence than it is able to act on as 
illustrated in Figure 1. In a 2019 hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation, the Coast Guard claimed that it is only capable of detecting and 
targeting 20 percent of all known drug movements and successfully interdicting six percent 
of those movements.124 While many factors explain why JIATF South cannot meet the 
goals established in the national strategy, such as smugglers changing tactics, modes of 
transportation, and routes within the transit zone, SOUTHCOM and Coast Guard 
leadership have both cited insufficient inventory of vessels and aircraft as the largest 
factor.125 
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Figure 1. JIATF South Interdiction Continuum Measures.126 
The Coast Guard is the workhorse of JIATF South operations. In fiscal year 2018, 
the Coast Guard provided 17 percent of patrol aircraft, 74 percent of ships, and all LEDET 
support to JIATF South.127 The Coast Guard acknowledges that it is the primary source of 
interdiction assets, but an aging fleet of cutters is making the mission difficult. The Coast 
Guard’s workhorse is its medium endurance cutter, many of which are over 50 years old. 
The Coast Guard uses the “Reliance,” “Famous,” and “Alex Haley” class of medium 
endurance cutters. The “Alex Haley” class consists of a single vessel built in 1979 and 
converted from a salvage ship to a cutter in 1997. From 1964 to 1997, 16 “Reliance” class 
cutters were built.128 Between 1986 and 1987, 14 of these cutters underwent an overhaul, 
but budget cuts caused two vessels of the class to be decommissioned. In 2005, the Coast 
Guard began to put these ships through a mission effectiveness project. The project was 
intended to ensure these ships could continue to carry out their mission until replaced by 
the offshore patrol cutter and the project was completed in 2014. The “Famous” class of 
cutters has a similar history, although slightly younger when entering service in 1983 and 
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going through the same mission effectiveness project as the “Reliance” class cutters to 
extend their life cycle until replaced by the offshore patrol cutter.129 
The Coast Guard is currently recapitalizing its fleet, and it is actively building 
national security cutters, offshore patrol cutters, and fast response patrol cutters.130 The 
national security cutter is the most capable platform; the first ship was commissioned in 
2008, and since then, eight national security cutters have been completed, and three more 
are currently under construction.131 The Coast Guard is in the process of procuring 25 
offshore patrol cutters, 58 Fast response cutters, and at least 11 National Security Cutters. 
While these numbers sound significant, these vessels are being procured to replace a total 
of 90 high-endurance, medium-endurance, and patrol craft. The Coast Guard’s studies have 
found that the vessels in procurement will only equate to 61 percent of the cutters needed 
to accomplish the Coast Guard’s missions.132 
Completion of the JIATF South mission is heavily reliant on the upgraded 
technology onboard the “National Security Cutters.” The Coast Guard analyzed 18 months 
of interdictions and attributed the increased level of success to its ability to conduct organic 
intelligence using tactical cryptology afloat.133 Tactical cryptology afloat allows a vessel 
to detect and obtain a fix based on electromagnetic emitters on specific signals of interest 
that can be attributed to suspect ships.134 The tactical cryptology afloat is a capability 
installed on most U.S. Navy vessels and demonstrates another area where the Navy can 
possibly provide additional assets to close the gap that the Coast Guard has identified.  
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This chapter illustrates that JIATF South is performing to the best of its abilities to 
bring agencies together in achieving maritime border security and efficiently managing 
each agency’s resources. While JIATF South continues to demonstrate why it is a prime 
example of how an interagency task force should operate, it still requires additional assets 
to improve maritime border security and increase its impact on the flow of illegal drugs to 
the United States. By leveraging the assets and capabilities within the U.S. Navy to 
supplement Coast Guard assets in the homeland security mission set, more maritime patrol 
aircraft and surface assets need to be made available for tasking. Additionally, leveraging 
new technology in unmanned systems JIATF South could detect suspect vessels earlier, 
track longer, and further narrow down the necessary patrol areas for surface assets. 
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III. UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES 
The U.S. Navy is currently pursuing a variety of USVs as a force multiplier to 
counter the overall rapid build-up of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).135 
Providing this technology to JIATF South for use in the WHTZ would increase the assets 
available, which the SOUTHCOM Commander and Coast Guard Deputy Commander for 
Operations have stated are necessary to increase detection and interdiction.136 The Navy 
has begun the process of procuring two unmanned vehicles: the Large Unmanned Surface 
Vehicle (LUSV) and the Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV).In addition to these 
large unmanned vehicles, the Navy is also pursuing smaller USVs and undersea vehicles, 
as well as various unmanned aerial vehicles.137  
This chapter discusses USVs under development by the Navy, particularly the large 
and medium unmanned vehicles. Also discussed are the current plans for integrating 
unmanned technology into the fleet and the challenges associated with USVs.  
A. UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES IN DEVELOPMENT 
The Navy is investing in the research and development of unmanned vehicles while 
pursuing a more distributed fleet architecture.138 The new fleet architecture paves the way 
for exceeding the previous 355-ship goal by reducing the portion of the fleet currently 
dominated by larger ships, such as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious 
ships, and increasing the number of smaller ships like frigates and corvettes.139 Creating 
this fleet architecture allows the Navy to go beyond the previous goal of a 355-ship Navy. 
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Unmanned or optionally manned vessels represent a new tier of surface vessels to achieve 
the distributed fleet architecture.140  
Navy and DOD leaders have determined that the distributed fleet architecture is 
operationally necessary, technically feasible, and affordable.141 Navy expert Ronald 
O’Rourke writes, “Navy and Marine Corps officials have suggested that shifting to a more 
distributed force architecture will support the implementation of the Navy and Marine 
Corps new overarching operational concept, called distributed maritime operations and a 
supporting Marine Corps’ concept of expeditionary advanced base operations.”142 The 
concept of distributed maritime operations, while a newer term, is not a new concept and 
is an expansion of the network centric warfare concept. The primary role of network centric 
warfare was to “provide increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, 
and shooters to achieve shared awareness.”143 The development of network centric warfare 
is enabling the Navy to pursue unmanned vehicles for fleet operations. 
The distributed maritime operations idea began during the Cold War with the 
realization of significant anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) capabilities.144 In countering the 
ASCM threat, the Navy made a shift from guns to missiles and developed the first tactical 
data links. These data links allowed each connected unit to share its radar picture and build 
a greater level of awareness than was previously accomplished via radio communication. 
The Navy and DOD has continued to improve tactical data links to the point that ships and 
aircraft can now share raw sensor data to allow any platform to perform targeting and 
weapon engagement based on another platforms combat system.145 
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The distributed maritime operations term first appeared in A Design for 
Maintaining Maritime Superiority published in 2018 by then Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral John Richardson. Admiral Richardson’s design focused on four lines of effort, 
two of which focus on distributed maritime operations.146 The first of the two lines of 
effort, “strengthen naval power at and from the sea,” tasks the Navy with continuing the 
distributed maritime operations concept and its key supporting concepts so that its 
effectiveness can be analyzed during large-scale exercises.147 The second line of effort 
then tasks the fleet with building an operational architecture that will include “a tactical 
grid to connect distributed nodes, data storage, processing power, and technology stacks at 
the nodes, an overarching data strategy, and analytic tools such as artificial 
intelligence/machine learning, and services that support fast, sound decisions.”148 
Figure 2 illustrates what the surface force architecture may look like once USVs 
become available. Currently, the LSC makes up the majority of the fleet, with a ratio of 
two to every one SSC.149 With the fleet design restructured, LSCs would become the 
minority of vessels while MUSVs would be the majority. The illustration shows unmanned 
vessels carrying sensors and payloads, which could be weapons. This distribution, along 
with improvements in network centric warfare, can allow the large and small surface 
combatants, responsible for command and control, to remain outside of an enemy’s 
engagement range, which thus protects the Navy’s largest investment of ships and 
personnel.150 This structure of distributed fleet architecture and distributed maritime 
operations could allow the United States to win a war of attrition in a complex naval war. 
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Figure 2. Proposed Surface Force Architecture.151 
1. Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle  
In 2017, the Navy began developing USVs under the Overlord program led by the 
Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office. The office’s purpose is to find new capabilities 
that can be added to existing systems and weapons within the DOD.152 The intention of 
the Overlord Program was to convert existing vessels USVs over a three-year period before 
moving forward with a program to procure unmanned vessels of 200–300 foot length and 
a displacement of 1,000 to 2,000 tons.153 This conversion was to be achieved over a three-
year timeline that would ultimately result in a vehicle capable of sustaining a 90-day 
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autonomous underway period with payloads for Electronic Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, 
and Strike Warfare.154 The plan is broken up into two phases. Phase one is a 12-month 
period with an end goal of a USV capable of autonomous navigation and mission 
execution. The final demonstration of phase one called for the vessel to complete eight 
demonstrations, such as navigating in open ocean, obstacle detection, navigating in low 
and high contact density environments, and in navigating in higher sea states in accordance 
with International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.155 
Phase one of this program was completed in September 2019 with phase two 
beginning in October of the same year. Phase two is using the same ships from phase one, 
but introduces more government furnished equipment to prove integration of command 
and control systems.156 With a basic concept of the LUSV proven, the Navy is using 
additional money to procure another two prototypes in 2021 and then one more prototype 
in 2022. In 2023, the Navy will shift the LUSV to its own program of record and utilize 
the shipbuilding budget to procure a total of seven LUSVs through 2025.157 
Navy leadership feels it is essential to get the capabilities of the LUSV to the fleet 
as soon as possible; this urgency is driving their accelerated procurement strategy. The 
Navy’s budget director, Rear Admiral Randy Crites said the Navy needs to determine 
details of command and control and the concept of operations quickly to get the test 
platforms online and determine how they work.158 The LUSV development and 
implementation are the beginning of a paradigm shift within the Navy considering fleet 
assets. Director of Surface Warfare, Rear Admiral Ronald Boxall, has stated, “it is a shift 
in mindset that says instead of putting as much stuff on the ship for as much money as I 
have…you start saying: ‘How small can my platform be to get everything I need to be on 
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it.’”159 This statement is in reference to the distributed fleet architecture that the Navy is 
now pursuing that illustrates capabilities in favor of a large number of small-specialized 
vessels.  
2. Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
The MUSV is intended to be very similar in capabilities to the LUSV with the 
exception that it is being developed to serve as an ISR and electronic warfare platform. The 
target size of the MUSV is 45- to 150-foot long and approximately 500 tons.160 The MUSV 
program is building on the work that Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) has already completed in designing and employing a capable MUSV design. 
DARPA built the prototype Sea Hunter, a 132-foot 140-ton vessel designed to conduct 
anti-submarine warfare missions by autonomously detecting and continuously trailing the 
suspected submarine; hence, the project name ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel 
(ACTUV).161 
While the LUSV is being built to carry out multiple missions, the MUSV program 
is centered on offering a platform for various sensors. Following DARPA’s success, the 
Navy awarded a $35-million contract to L3 Technologies for the development of an MUSV 
prototype with the option of purchasing up to eight follow-on vessels.162 The requirements 
for the prototype call for a “vessel that will function as a sensor and communications 
relay…able to carry a payload equivalent to a 40-foot shipping container, will operate on 
its own for at least 60 days before needing to return to port, and capable of refueling at 
sea.”163 The Navy wants MUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, and reconfigurable so 
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that they can accept various payloads. These tenets will allow commanders to use these 
platforms aggressively and accept greater risk in their employment. Since they are low cost 
and unmanned, commanders are able to view them as expendable in carrying out higher 
risk missions. 
3. Current USV Integration Efforts 
In May 2019, the Navy created Surface Development Squadron One 
(SURFDEVRON). The squadron was established by repurposing the previous Zumwalt 
Squadron that was tasked with manning, training, and equipping the Zumwalt class 
destroyers as they were delivered to the Navy. The new squadron’s mission is to test and 
experiment with new technology, namely weapons systems and unmanned vessels to 
determine the best way they can be integrated into the Fleet.164 The new squadron will 
build up in three phases. The first phase consisted of the name and mission change. In 
phase two, FYs 2020 through 2023, the squadron will receive its third Zumwalt destroyer 
and the two Sea Hunter prototype USVs. In phase three, as the Navy begins to accept 
delivery of LUSVs and MUSVs, the squadron will be ready to integrate the unmanned 
vessels fully into exercises and deployments.165 
In 2021, the Navy plans to begin integrating the Sea Hunter prototypes into multiple 
fleet exercises. By the end of the year, SURFDEVRON should receive its second Sea 
Hunter prototype and both Overlord LUSV prototypes. In the fleet exercises, the command 
and control systems will be tested while they perform as part of surface action groups and 
begin to train sailors on the platforms.166 Both the Overlord and Sea Hunter vessels have 
each completed autonomous multi-day transits previously, Sea Hunter from California to 
Hawaii and back, and Overlord from Alabama to the West Coast through the Panama 
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Canal.167 After the Overlord vessel completed its transit, it then spent 130 hours 
autonomously operating and participating in Exercise Dawn Blitz, which marked the first 
time an unmanned vessel integrated with Navy and Marine Corps forces. The vessel 
successfully avoided collisions, maintained its assigned station, and completed loiter and 
transit missions.168 The goals for 2021 are to extend the length of transits to 30 days while 
incorporating additional testing into payloads and command and control. 
B. CHALLENGES FACING UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES 
While the Navy has been successful in USV testing to date, many challenges still 
lie ahead of the program. The first challenge is convincing Congress to adopt the Navy’s 
accelerated acquisition strategy. In the Navy’s FY 2020 budget review, Congress cited its 
concerns regarding the accelerated strategy for procurement of the LUSV, specifically 
concerning the request for procurement of two additional LUSV prototypes on top of the 
two previously procured by the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO).169 The Senate Armed 
Services Committee understood that the two LUSVs previously procured were still 
sufficient in completing testing under the SCO and stated concerns regarding the request 
for two more prototypes before fully evaluating the existing vessels and applying lessons 
learned. The committee concluded that further procurement of LUSVs should only occur 
after requirements are further defined and the results of SCO testing are incorporated into 
future designs based on the likelihood of the program exceeding the Major Defense 
Acquisition Program cost threshold. Ultimately, the Senate recommended reducing the 
proposed $507 million down to $134.5 million.170 Later in the report, the committee again 
stated its concerns for acquisition of both the LUSV and MUSV and feared that the 
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proposed plans could lead to receiving too many USVs before determining if the USV met 
operational needs. The committee then directed the Navy to submit acquisition roadmaps 
for both the LUSV and MUSV directed at addressing the specific concerns. 
The second major issue in developing USVs is the lack of a coherent concept of 
operations (CONOPS). No overarching doctrine or naval instruction exists concerning the 
use of USVs and the manner in which they will operate with manned ships. As mentioned, 
the Navy did move forward with establishing SURFDEVRON ONE to provide a 
consolidated organization tasked with testing and experimentation to determine the best 
CONOPS. However, the Navy is continuing to award contracts for vessels and prototypes 
before the CONOPS are established.171 An October 2020 press release identified that 
SURFDEVRON ONE was still working on completing the CONOPS requested in January. 
The CONOPS are written in two parts, with the first covering how the Navy plans to “man, 
train, and equip” the USVs while the second discusses how the vessels will be 
employed.172 However, it does not address if it is likely that the current USV contracts 
will meet the standards required in the CONOPS being drafted.  
The next concern regards the Navy’s planned distributed fleet architecture. While 
not a secret that the Chinese PLAN is rapidly growing, which led to the adopted concept, 
the Navy has not conducted any clear studies or analyses to determine that this approach is 
indeed the best one.173 No plan currently exists as to how USVs will be supported overseas 
or while on a mission. The Navy spends a significant effort ensuring its ships are prepared 
for deployment and planning to support those ships for the duration of the mission, if that 
means port visits for supplies or underway replenishment. While the design specifications 
call for USVs to be capable of at sea refueling, critical questions still remain as to how that 
refueling will be performed. Captain Pete Small, the Navy’s unmanned maritime systems 
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program manager, is keenly aware of these issues.174 Captain Small said in an interview 
that the missions USVs were expected to participate in would take place far from the shores 
of the United States, and it is not yet clear how the Navy intends to get the LUSV and 
MUSV on station. He notes that requirements and specifications need to be determined to 
identify if the LUSVs and MUSVs will be capable of feasibly completing a long open 
ocean transit; or if they will need to be heavy lifted into position. If so, the necessary vessels 
for transit need to be identified.175 
The final main concern regarding USVs is planning for miscalculation or escalation 
at sea, as well as preventing capture. Events regarding unmanned systems in 2019 proved 
that they could be easy targets after Iran shot down a U.S. Navy RQ-4A Global Hawk, 
which Iran stated violated Iranian airspace near the Strait of Hormuz.176 While the first 
time Iranian forces deliberately targeted a U.S. asset, it was not the first altercation between 
the United States and Iran concerning sovereignty. In January 2016, two U.S. Navy riverine 
command boats transited through Iranian territorial waters. While near Farsi Island and 
within Iranian territorial waters, one of the vessels suffered an engineering casualty that 
required it to stop. By the time the crew was able to repair their vessel, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps—Navy (IRGCN) had approached the vessels and ultimately 
captured both vessels and crews.177 
Evan Karlik hypothesizes that unmanned systems are perceived as relatively 
expendable and increase the danger of escalation by lowering the threshold for military 
action.178 Karlik goes on to claim that if an adversary were to sink a U.S. destroyer, a 
declaration of war would certainly follow, while if an unmanned system or satellite were 
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deliberately destroyed, the United States would not immediately escalate. The incidents 
described in the Strait of Hormuz support Karlik’s hypothesis. When the unmanned aerial 
vehicle was destroyed, no immediate escalation resulted, and since the riverine crews were 
captured but ultimately released without harm, no further escalation occurred. The IRGCN 
was likely deterred from escalating the situation due to the presence of U.S. military 
personnel. However, if the IRGCN had encountered a USV, the situation may have turned 
out very differently. Unmanned systems operating significant distances from support 
vessels and near other nations’ territorial waters could lead to similar scenarios due to 
engine casualties, and if support personnel were unable to intervene before an adversary, 
the technology that permits their operation and effectiveness could be compromised.179 
C. CONCLUSION 
The research and development that has been accomplished on the LUSV and 
MUSV directly relates to the capabilities needed to bolster success in the WHTZ. These 
vessels have demonstrated the capability to carry the sensors necessary, as well as operate 
autonomously. The Navy has yet to decide how these vessels will be employed and the 
CONOPS is still in development, but employing these vessels in the transit zone may 
provide JIATF South with the assets it requires and allow the Navy to identify additional 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis examined how the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and JIATF South work 
together to accomplish the maritime border security mission. The increased border security 
measures the Trump administration implemented along the United States’ land border with 
Mexico advanced the likelihood of increased maritime smuggling events to circumvent the 
“border wall.”180 This thesis began by examining the five major threats to the United 
States’ maritime security identified in The National Strategy for Maritime Security: nation-
state threats, terrorist threats, transnational criminal and piracy threats, environmental 
destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration, and explained how the Navy and Coast 
Guard operate to counter these threats.181 
The U.S. Navy is focused on operations that increase maritime security abroad 
while focusing on nation-state threats. While the Navy’s actions and deployments will also 
combat the remaining threats, they are not typically pursued as primary missions. The Navy 
uses various levels of cooperative and coercive naval diplomacy to achieve its goals. It 
heavily relies on its presence near perceived threats to act as a deterrent toward taking 
actions the United States views as unfavorable.182 
The U.S. Coast Guard focuses on each of the remaining maritime security threats. 
The Coast Guard is designated as the lead agency for interdicting maritime drug traffickers 
and is the primary source of interdiction assets within the JIATF South’s area of 
responsibility.183 The Coast Guard struggles to keep up with the required operational 
tempo for its aging fleet and is in desperate need of an increased budget to procure new 
ships and maintain its existing fleet.184 
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JIATF South is designated as the lead agency for coordinating all detection and 
monitoring activities within the WHTZ.185 JIATF South leverages its intelligence 
capabilities and partnerships with foreign nations to detect, monitor, and interdict vessels 
suspected of smuggling narcotics.186 JIATF South has proven it is a competent agency 
with regard to maximizing the use of assets available for maritime border security missions 
as it has transitioned from relying on defense in depth of interdiction assets to relying on 
intelligence reports to allow prepositioning of an interdiction asset.187  
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis identified weaknesses in the cooperation and interoperability between 
the United States’ Coast Guard and Navy. However, the research results determined that 
JIATF South is the agency tasked with amassing resources not just from the Coast Guard 
and Navy, but also from all agencies with a role in counter-narcotics operations to detect 
and interdict narcotics smugglers. Furthermore, the research determined that JIATF South 
continued to be effective in interdicting narcotics bound for the United States even when 
facing the problem of limited interdiction assets. 
The issue that needs to be addressed to increase maritime border security is not how 
these agencies can improve interoperability and cooperation, but what assets, resources, 
and capabilities does JIATF South need to interdict all the smuggling events of which it is 
aware? This thesis explored a solution based on the U.S.Navy’s pursuit of USVs to provide 
a large number of assets while reducing operating and procurement costs.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary method for improving JIATF South’s operational effectiveness is to 
increase the number of assets it has available for detection, monitoring, and interdiction. 
USVs represent the most cost-effective method to improve this effectiveness, as long as 
the USVs developed possess a few standard capabilities. These capabilities are a surface 
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search radar, the ability to continuously track and maintain a specified distance from a 
target, and the ability to relay its own position and the positional data of the target it is 
tracking.  
The surface search radar capability is the most important of the required 
capabilities. With this capability, USVs can detect suspect smuggling vessels. The 
challenge with employing a surface search radar on platforms of the intended size of the 
LUSV and MUSV is that the height of the radar will be limited, which will result in a 
relatively small radar range. The MUSV has completed a test involving the Towed 
Airborne Lift of Naval Systems (TALONS), which permits the MUSV to carry a 150-
pound payload of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications 
equipment to an altitude of 1,000 feet. During the test, the MUSV increased its surface 
search radar effective range by 500 percent, and the range of the attached radio tripled.188 
While participating in Exercise Dawn Blitz, the LUSV prototype has demonstrated 
the ability to autonomously maintain station and safely navigate.189 A vessel’s ability to 
maintain a designated station in relation to another vessel will be necessary for assisting 
JIATF South with its mission since these unmanned vessels will not have the capability to 
conduct complete interdiction operations. The USV’s role in maritime security is to detect 
suspect vessels and maintain contact so that the interdiction team can intercept and 
complete the mission. USVs are not suitable as interdiction assets themselves since they 
have no ability to force a vessel to comply or carry out a boarding and inspection. 
Finally, these vessels will need to be capable of sending and receiving data 
regarding target vessels. The Navy, Coast Guard, and many partner nations can share near-
real-time data using various tactical data links. This capability will be necessary so that an 
USV can receive information regarding the location, course, and speed of a suspect vessel 
and maneuver to perform the intercept. Once the USV has detected the suspect vessel, the 
vessel’s actual location, course, and speed can be broadcasted to JIATF South headquarters 
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and all other assets in the operating area so that interdiction teams can prepare for 
completing the interdiction. This method would also allow JIATF South to determine if a 
suspect vessel might be within a partner nation’s territorial waters before the interdiction 
team could stop the vessel. This way, JIATF South can begin coordinating with applicable 
law enforcement agencies to intercept suspected smugglers on their shores. 
USVs should continue to be developed and funded via the Navy and 
SURFDEVRON ONE. Once SURFDEVRON ONE can determine the equipment, 
personnel, procedures, and policies regarding the employment of USVs, the squadron 
should establish a detachment of trained sailors and available USVs at JIATF South 
headquarters. By establishing a detachment within the JIATF South area of responsibility, 
USVs and the personnel necessary to operate and maintain them can be under the 
operational control of JIATF South. By operating in this environment, SURFDEVRON 
ONE can utilize USVs in real world scenarios to identify weaknesses and any maintenance 
issues that may arise. During this time, JIATF South can also assess the capabilities of 
USVs and determine how many would be necessary to detect the maximum number of 
suspected smuggling vessels. Once this number is determined, and USVs continue to be 
manufactured and delivered to the Navy, a permanent unit should be established within 
JIATF South for operating and maintaining the USVs. 
USVs should continue to be a Navy asset, with the understanding that JIATF South 
will require the number necessary to accomplish their mission, and those vessels will not 
be available for other naval tasking. Thus, the Coast Guard will not become responsible for 
procuring their own USVs since the Coast Guard’s budget is approximately six percent of 
the Navy’s budget for fiscal year 2021.190 The Navy already has the contracts in place for 
manufacturing the USVs, and the acquisitions process has already begun for both the 
MUSV and LUSV.191 
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Operating USVs in the JIATF South area of responsibility provides unique 
situations, such as testing the vessel’s seaworthiness in rough seas, as the region is 
impacted by several tropical storms and hurricanes each year. It is also a relatively safe 
environment free from adversaries in which further testing with other naval vessels and 
platforms can be conducted.  
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While it is unlikely that the United States will ever achieve the ability to stop all 
narcotics traffickers, technological advancements should allow the United States and its 
partners to gain greater awareness of the problem at hand. Further research is needed to 
determine the impact these technologies, such as artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, may have on the maritime border security mission, specifically toward targeting 
suspect smuggling vessels. Is it possible that artificial intelligence will be used to analyze 
data based on where target vessels are first detected and their direction and speed to 
determine their point of origin? If achievable, it may be possible to determine a DTO’s 
“pattern of life” that the United States and allied nations can possibly use to their advantage. 
As artificial intelligence and machine learning improve, further research can enable JIATF 
South to operate an extensive network of autonomous surface vehicles. This network could 
enable USVs to receive intelligence and automatically position themselves in the best 
position to detect and track target vessels. With these questions answered, JIATF South 
could become an incredibly lean and effective force that can make numerous assets from 
all involved agencies available for different tasking.  
In addition to determining how new technologies may possibly improve JIATF 
South’s performance, it is also necessary to determine new metrics for measuring success. 
Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard and JIATF South base their performance on the amount 
of cocaine and other narcotics interdicted, versus the total estimated amount transported 
for a given year. These numbers are often impressive, but also vary wildly from year to 
year. As Munsing and Lamb note, determining the damage done to DTOs is a better 
50 
measure of success.192 Suppose U.S. agencies could determine how these organizations 
are affected financially by the seizure of smuggling vessels and narcotics. Such an 
understanding could allow for increased targeting of the DTO’s overall organization. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Due to the metrics JIATF South uses to measure success and its ability to interdict 
10 percent or less of all known smuggling events in a given year, it is difficult to determine 
if JIATF South’s actions have any lasting effect on DTOs and TCOs. The United States’ 
Coast Guard and Navy currently cooperate and provide available resources to JIATF South, 
but it is simply not enough to make significant progress in drug interdictions. JIATF South 
needs the tools necessary to detect and interdict additional smuggling events, and USVs 
may be one of these tools. 
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